Downloaded from https://www.everyspec.com Chapter 2 Department of the Army Physical Security Program (c) Vulnerable to a threat that is intent on removing protected items of equipment or property. (2) A risk analysis per DA Pam 190–51 will be conducted for each MEVA. (a) The risk analysis will be conducted by the PM with the assistance of the personnel assigned to the unit or activity. (b) The PM will rank the MEVAs according to the results of the risk analyses, which include existing physical security measures and procedures. (3) All MEVAs must be inspected. (4) Example of activities that should be considered for designa- tion as MEVAs are listed below.
The installation commander will approve those to be designated as MEVAs. (a) Ammunition and explosive storage rooms, facilities, or areas. (b) Arms storage or manufacturing, rebuilding, or demilitarizing facilities and areas. (c) Airfields, aircraft parking, or aircraft maintenance areas. (d) Classified sites or locations. (e) Command posts (main and alternate). (f) Communications facilities. (g) Consolidated supply and storage operations. (h) Controlled drug narcotic vaults or storage areas. (i) Major data processing facilities. (j) Field maintenance shops. (k) Finance offices. (l) IDS monitor stations. (m) Motor pools and maintenance activities.
( n ) P e t r o l e u m , o i l , l u b r i c a n t s ( P O L ) s t o r a g e a n d d i s p e n s i n g points. (o) Power supply transmission facilities (alternate and primary). (p) Water sources. (q) Medical (Note R) storage areas. e . T h e p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , l e g a l , t e r r a i n , w e a t h e r , a n d t h r e a t climate. f. The cost and availability of resources being protected, includ- ing the personnel, materiel, equipment, and funds needed to provide minimum protection. g. The status of the installation, including the possible expansion, relocation, and other changes in operation, to include mobilization and transition to war. 2–1.
General The DA Physical Security Program is a component of the force protection program. This chapter— a. Describes the systematic approach that is the basis for the design of physical security programs to ensure protection of all DA assets on the installations and other locations occupied by DA elements. b. Includes responsibilities outlined in AR 5–9. c. Includes the requirements for physical security threat assess- ments, installation physical security plans, and physical security surveys and inspections. 2–2. Crime prevention a. Crime prevention is a command responsibility.
A successful p r o g r a m n e e d s c o n t i n u i n g c o m m a n d e m p h a s i s ; c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y should not be allowed to detract from mission accomplishment. b. An effective crime prevention program will help maximize the security of a military community in peace and war. Its goals are similar to (and support those of) the installation physical security and operational security (OPSEC) programs. Methods used to iden- tify and analyze crime problems complement each other. c. A crime prevention program is designed to reduce crime by— ( 1 ) S t i m u l a t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e c r i m e p r e v e n t i o n a t t i t u d e s , p r o c e - dures, and behavior.
(2) Protecting potential victims or property from criminal acts by anticipating crime possibilities and eliminating or reducing opportu- nities for the acts to occur. (3) Discouraging potential offenders from committing criminal acts. 2–3. Physical security program design Installation physical security programs shall be designed to— a. Ensure effective and efficient use of resources. b. Meet the needs of the installation during peacetime to protect against the traditional criminal, terrorist, and hostile intelligence operations. c.
Expand to allow for security measures that will include plans for security of the installation to permit the rapid marshaling and deployment of forces and materiel during mobilization, and in times of national emergency or war. 2–5. Physical security planning considerations The requirements below will be considered when developing physi- cal security plans. a. During peacetime, the planning for mobilization and war, as well as for current and contingency operations, must be accom- plished.
Physical security requirements will be integrated into all plans to ensure conservation of physical security resources and ef- f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n o f p e r s o n n e l , f a c i l i t i e s , a n d e q u i p m e n t w i t h i n Army responsibility. b. Peacetime planning considerations will be evaluated to permit adjustments in physical security as the threat changes during mobili- zation and war.
Physical security planning will be tied to the de- fense readiness condition system and the terrorist threat conditions (see AR 190–16 appendix B and AR 525–13) so that as the threat intensifies and readiness increases, equivalent levels of physical security measures and procedures are added. c. Tactical defense plans will be developed for each installation or activity, to include support installations and key facilities. d. A plan to control the access to roads that enter and exit the installation will be established. Road closure and restriction plans will be coordinated with local and state law enforcement agencies.
Contingency road closings will be included in the installation physi- cal security plan. The plan will also include restricting movement w i t h i n s p e c i f i c a r e a s o f t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n , a s r e q u i r e d . ( S e e A R 210–10 for a discussion on the control of installation entry and exit.) e. During unit training and operations that require security pre- cautions, the application of physical security procedures should be tested to protect against— (1) Hostile intelligence gathering operations (for example, satel- lites, offshore monitoring, human intelligence (HUMINT)). 2–4.
Physical security program factor assessment To determine the type and extent of the commitment of resources toward installation physical security programs, commanders must assess those factors that will influence their program. The following should be taken into consideration— a. The importance of the mission to the Army and installation. b. The local threat assessment (per paras 2–8 and 2–9). c . T h e d e f i n i t i o n a n d a n a l y s i s o f t h e a r e a t o b e p r o t e c t e d including— (1) The nature and arrangement of the activity. (2) The number of personnel involved. (3) The monetary, tactical, or strategic value of materiel located in the protected area.
(4) The storage of classified information and equipment. ( 5 ) O t h e r s e c u r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s u c h a s e x i s t i n g n a t u r a l o r man–made hazards. d. When the protected area is designated as a MEVA. MEVAs consist of information, equipment, property, and facilities recom- mended by the PM and approved by the installation commander as r e q u i r i n g a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n t h r o u g h a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n c r e a s e d physical security measures, procedures, and equipment. (1) A facility or area will be designated as a MEVA if it is— (a) Essential to the accomplishment of the installation or organi- zation mission.
(b) Vulnerable to a threat that is intent on destroying, damaging, or tampering with property or equipment, including terrorism. 5 AR 190–13 • 30 September 1993