Downloaded from https://www.everyspec.com (2) Paramilitary forces. (3) Terrorists or saboteurs. (4) Traditional criminal elements. (5) Protest groups. (6) Disaffected persons. f. Installations or organizations that expand upon mobilization must identify buildings and facilities to be assigned to expanded activities (for example, hospital wards, USAR schools, logistics warehouses). Once the mobilization assignment has been made, buildings and facilities should be evaluated for physical security requirements. Within the means of the installations, reasonable ef- f o r t s s h o u l d b e m a d e t o c o r r e c t i d e n t i f i e d p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y deficiencies. b.
Installation threat statements will be disseminated to all subor- dinate and tenant activities. The threat statement will be included in the installation physical security plan (see para 2–9). 2–9. Physical security plan format The physical security plan per FM 19–30, appendix F, will be used as a guide in developing the installation physical security plan. Annexes to the plan may be separated for operational purposes as required; however, the location of the annexes will be listed in the plan. The physical security plan, including all annexes, shall be exercised at least once every two years in order to evaluate its effectiveness. As a minimum, annexes to the plan will include— a.
An installation threat statement per paragraph 2–8. b. A terrorism counteraction plan. c. A bomb threat plan. As a minimum, the bomb threat plan should provide guidance for— (1) Control of operation. (2) Evacuation. (3) Search. (4) Finding the bomb or suspected bomb. (5) Disposal. (6) Detonation and damage control. (7) Control of publicity. (8) After–action report. d. An installation closure plan per paragraph 2–5 d . e. A natural disaster plan. This plan will be coordinated with natural disaster plans of local jurisdictions. At a minimum, the natural disaster plan should provide guidance for— (1) Control of operation. (2) Evacuation. (3) Communication. (4) Control of publicity.
(5) Physical security. (6) After–action report. f. A civil disturbance plan. It is the commander’s responsibility to formulate a civil disturbance plan based on local threats. (For exam- ple, commanders of nuclear facilities should anticipate the need to d e v e l o p c r o w d c o n t r o l p r o c e d u r e s t o h a n d l e a n t i – n u c l e a r demonstrations.) g. A resource plan to meet minimum essential physical security needs for the installation or activity. h. A communications plan. This plan is required to establish communications with other federal agencies and local law enforce- ment agencies to share information about possible threats.
The com- m u n i c a t i o n s p l a n s h o u l d a d d r e s s a l l c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e e d s f o r paragraphs b through f above. i. A list of designated restricted areas in accordance with para 6–3. j. A list of installation MEVAs. 2–6. Coordination a. In developing a security plan, coordination and close liaison should be effected between the military commander and— (1) Adjacent installations or units. (2) Federal agencies. (3) State and local agencies. (4) Similar host country agencies. b.
To the extent permissible, such interaction should allow for an exchange of intelligence, information on security measures being employed, contingency plans, and any other information to enhance local security. c. On an installation, the host activity shall assume responsibility for coordinating physical security efforts of all tenants, regardless of the components represented, as outlined in the support agreements and the host activity security plan. Applicable provisions shall be included in, or be an appendix to, the support agreement. A formal agreement will contain definite assignment of physical security re- sponsibility for the items stored.
The agreement should address— (1) Maximum quantities to be stored. (2) Physical safeguards to be used. (3) Frequency of, and responsibility for, physical inventories or reconciliation’s. (4) Reporting of losses for investigation. (5) Lock and key control. (6) Unit that has overall responsibility for the storage facility. (7) Procedures for authorization and identification of individuals to receipt for, and physically take custody of, Army property. d. The purpose of such coordination is protection in depth. Au- thority, jurisdiction, and responsibility must be set forth in a manner that ensures protection and avoids duplication of effort. 2–7.
Contingency plans In most instances it will be necessary to increase security for arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) and other sensitive property, and assets and facilities during periods of natural disasters, natural emergencies, or periods of increased threat from terrorist or criminal elements. Therefore, contingency plans should include provisions for increasing the physical security measures and procedures based on the local commander’s assessment of the situation. These provi- sions should be designed for early detection of an attempted intru- sion, theft, or interruption of normal security conditions. 2–10. DA Form 2806–R (Physical Security Survey Report) (RCSCSGA–1672) a.
DA Form 2806–R (Physical Security Survey Report) is a for- mal recorded assessment of an installation’s physical security pro- gram. It should provide the commander an assessment of the overall security posture of the installation, given the threat and mission, and advise the commander on the installation physical security pro- gram’s strengths and weaknesses. Specific procedures and measures evaluated include— (1) Threat assessment procedures. (2) Types of security personnel assigned. (3) Control of visitors and packages. (4) Use of PSE. (5) Identification of critical areas or facilities. b. Physical security surveys will be conducted— (1) When an installation is activated.
(2) When no record exists of a prior physical security survey. (3) Every 3 years. (4) Exceptions are as follows: (a) Those installations storing nuclear or chemical munitions will be surveyed every 18 months. 2–8. Security threat assessment a. Installations will develop a local threat statement. This state- ment will identify local threats, and make full use of the investiga- tive resources available in the geographic area to anticipate criminal a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y o f Army property and personnel. At a minimum, liaison shall be estab- lished with the following agencies:
(1) Local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office. (2) Local law enforcement agencies. ( 3 ) I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d i n v e s t i g a t i v e a g e n c i e s o f t h e u n i f o r m e d services. (4) Local Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms field office. (5) Host country agencies, where applicable. 6 AR 190–13 • 30 September 1993