MIL MIL-HDBK-683(AT) — MIL-HDBK-683(AT) Statistical Process Control (SPC) Handbook - Implementation & Evaluation PDF

Downloaded from https://www.everyspec.com MIL-HDBK-663(AT) b. For the sake of brevity, two potential failure modes were selected: fracture of the umbrella shaft, and (2) separation of the stitching of mbrella fabric. (1) the Based on thase Wo potential failure he, the effects of these fail&ea are recorded. The effect of the first failure would be catoat~ic in that the unbrella would be rendered uaeleae. The 8econd failure effect maY range from a cosmetic problem to leaks. d. The ~ step is to detexmdne the cause of failure. In the exa@e, the fracture of the wnbrella shaft could have been cauaed in two waye.

The shaft material may be thinner than specified or the environmental conditions (sevemhighwinda) may have exceeded design expectations. Regarding the umbrella cover where the stitching eeparatea, the cause of failure ia attrilmted to poor workmanship. e. In the risk analysis phase of FMEA, the probability of the failure of occurance is considered and rated. The failure ia then weighted for severity and capability to escape detection. These are subjective factors based on the engineer-s experience and previous history on similar items. Also, each failure mode is independently evaluated.

(1) With regard to the first failure mode---shaft fractures, the cause of failure due to thin material was considered not especially likely to occur and was given a low rating of three; whereas, the failure due to severe high winds was even less likely to occur and was given a very low rating of one. Regarding the second failure mode---stitching separates, the sole cause of failure due to poor workmanship was considered to almost always occur and was given a very high rating of nine. (2) Next, the severity/criticalityof the failure waa analysed. Since failure of the shaft made the umbrella unusable, it waa given a very high severity rating of nine.

On the other hand, stitch separation did not render the umbrella unusable although it may adversely impact on user acceptability. It was given a moderate severity rating of five- (3) Since the escape detection factor i8 essentially a function of inspection, the probability of detecting a weak umbrella shaft was coneidemd to be slightly better than average and was given a rating of six. Detecting poor workmanship in the stitching was considered excellent; hence was given a very high rating of nine. f. The next step in FMEA is to assign a risk priority number to each cmae of failure.

This is accomplished by multiplying together each of the risk factors rated in the aforementioned rick analysis phaee and recording them on the worksheet. Top priority for corrective action should be given to the cauee of failure with the highest risk priority number and all causes of faulures reviewed in descending order from highest to lowest risk priority number. 8- The required to appropriate final step in the FMEA is to identify the corrective actions eliminate the cause of each failure and to select the moat ones for implementation. 25